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Nationwide judicial power is a strong tool with far-reaching 
consequences. It is clear that the United States Supreme Court, as the 
highest court in the land, can exercise its power nationwide. But what 
about when a single federal district court judge makes a ruling that 
applies to the entire country? Instinctively, and described in these 
terms, this feels suspicious. Nationwide power is a strong authority for 
one judge to wield, as opposed to a panel of three judges or nine 
justices. This power is magnified when a nationwide scope is applied 
to preliminary injunctions. A preliminary injunction is an 
“extraordinary” remedy,1 and the type of relief it provides is “drastic 
medicine.”2 The practical effect of a nationwide preliminary 
injunction is that a single, unelected federal district court judge makes 
a ruling that applies to the entire nation prior to a full trial on the 
merits. Using a nationwide scope with an already remarkable form of 
 
 *  © 2017 Katherine B. Wheeler. 
 1. Munaf v. Green, 553 U.S. 674, 689 (2008). But see Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. U.S. 
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 145 F.3d 1399, 1408 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“[D]istrict courts enjoy broad 
discretion in awarding injunctive relief.”). 
 2. Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int’l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707, 715 (5th Cir. 1984). 
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relief creates a one-two punch of extraordinary and far-reaching 
judicial power. 
Despite the extreme nature of this remedy, there have been five 
different instances of various federal district court judges in Texas 
granting a nationwide preliminary injunction in the past two years.3 
This practice, however, is not unique to Texas. After the election of 
President Trump and his issuance of several controversial executive 
orders, district court judges granted nationwide preliminary 
injunctions in Washington,4 Maryland,5 Hawaii,6 California,7 and 
Illinois.8 Each of these preliminary injunctions has enjoined the 
federal government from implementing a policy or regulation across 
the entire country.9 This type of remedy is meant to be temporary, but 
in the interim, it can have a substantial impact on people’s day-to-day 
lives.10 For example, people in New York and Illinois had their 
employment authorization revoked as a result of the Texas v. United 
 
 3. See generally Franciscan All., Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp. 3d. 660 (N.D. Tex. 
2016) (enjoining the Department of Health and Human Services from enforcing its rule 
pursuant to the Affordable Care Act that prohibits discrimination on the basis of gender 
identity or termination of pregnancy); Nevada v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 218 F. Supp. 3d 520 
(E.D. Tex. 2016) (enjoining the Department of Labor from implementing and enforcing a 
rule that increases the minimum salary level required for exemption from Fair Labor 
Standards Act’s overtime requirements for executive, administrative, and professional 
employees); Texas v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 3d 810 (N.D.	Tex.	2016) (enjoining the 
Department of Education from enforcing its interpretation of “sex” to include gender 
identity within the scope of Title VII and Title IX); Nat’l Fed’n Indep. Bus. v. Perez, No. 
5:16-cv-00066, 2016 WL 3766121 (N.D. Tex. June 27, 2016) (enjoining the Department of 
Labor from implementing its new interpretation of the Advice Exemption Rule, which 
requires an attorney to disclose confidential client communications related to a 
unionization matter to the Department of Labor); Texas v. United States, 86	F.	Supp.	3d 
591 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (enjoining the United States and Department of Homeland Security 
from implementing the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent 
Residents program, which provides legal status to undocumented immigrants in the 
United States), aff’d, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d, 136 S.	Ct. 2271 (2016). 
 4. Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL 462040, at *2 (W.D. Wash. 
Feb. 3, 2017), motion for stay pending appeal denied, 847 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2017), 
appeal dismissed, No. 17-35105 (9th Cir. Mar. 8, 2017).  
 5. Int’l Refugee Assistance Program v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539, 565 (D. Md. 
2017), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017), vacated and remanded, __ 
S. Ct. __, 2017 WL 4518553 (Oct. 10, 2017) (mem.), dismissed as moot, No. 17-1351 (4th 
Cir. Nov. 20, 2017). 
 6. Hawaii v. Trump, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1227, 1237–38 (D. Haw. 2017), aff’d in part, 859 
F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2017), judgment vacated, __ S.Ct. __, 2017 WL 4782860 (Oct. 24, 2017) 
(mem.). 
 7. City of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 508–09 (N.D. Cal. 2017), appeal 
docketed, No. 17-16887 (9th Cir. Sept. 18, 2017). 
 8. City of Chicago v. Sessions, No. 17 C 5720, __ F. Supp. 3d __, __, 2017 WL 
4081821, at *14 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 15, 2017).  
 9. See supra notes 3–8 and accompanying text. 
 10. See infra note 11 and accompanying text. 
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States (Texas I)11 preliminary injunction granted by a judge in the 
Southern District of Texas.12 Moreover, the rationale for these 
nationwide preliminary injunctions is often conclusory and 
overbroad, and they rest on justifications used for permanent 
injunctions, a similar yet distinct remedy.13 The use of nationwide 
preliminary injunctions has not gone unnoticed by scholars,14 and it 
will likely receive even more attention given the rapid pace at which 
nationwide preliminary injunctions are being granted, the recent 
litigation surrounding President Trump’s immigration executive 
orders, and the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari, and subsequent 
dismissal as moot, in Trump v. International Refugee Assistance 
Project,15 a case involving a nationwide preliminary injunction.16 
There are a number of issues that arise when considering the 
implementation of nationwide preliminary injunctions, including 
 
 11. 86. F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tex. 2015). In Texas I, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the 
United States and the Department of Homeland Security from enacting “Deferred Action 
for Parents of American and Lawful Permanent Residents,” a program that would provide 
legal status and various benefits for undocumented immigrants. Id. at 604. 
 12. Complaint, Lopez v. Richardson, No. 1:16-cv-09670 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 12, 2016) 
(challenging the application of a preliminary injunction issued in the Southern District of 
Texas to residents of Illinois, which caused the revocation of complainant’s employment 
authorization); Amended Complaint, Make the Road N.Y. v. Baran, No. 1:16-cv-04756 
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2016) (challenging the application of a preliminary injunction issued in 
the Southern District of Texas to residents of New York, which caused the revocation of 
complainant’s employment authorization). 
 13. See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 188 (5th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he Constitution 
vests the District Court with ‘the judicial Power of the United States.’ That power is not 
limited to the district wherein the court sits but extends across the country.” (quoting U.S. 
CONST. art. III, §	1)), aff’d by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (mem.); 
Nevada v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 218 F. Supp. 3d 520, 534 (E.D. Tex. 2016) (“A nationwide 
injunction is proper in this case. The Final Rule is applicable to all states. Consequently, 
the scope of the alleged irreparable injury extends nationwide. A nationwide injunction 
protects both employees and employers from being subject to different EAP exemptions 
based on location. This Court is not alone in its decision.”) (citing Texas v. United States, 
201 F. Supp. 3d 810, 835–36 (N.D. Tex. 2016); Nat’l Fed’n. Indep. Bus. v. Perez, No. 5:16-
cv-00066-C, 2016 WL 3766121, at *46 (N.D. Tex. June 27, 2016)); see also infra Part II.  
 14. See e.g, Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 
118 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017); Michael T. Morley, De Facto Class Actions? 
Plaintiff- and Defendant-Oriented Injunctions in Voting Rights, Election Law, and Other 
Constitutional Cases, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 487, 487–556 (2016); Zayn Siddique, 
Nationwide Injunctions, 118 COLUMBIA L. REV. (forthcoming 2018); Daniel J. Walker, 
Note, Administrative Injunctions: Assessing the Propriety of Non-Class Collective Relief, 90 
CORNELL L. REV. 1119, 1119–52 (2005). 
 15. __ S. Ct. __, 2017 WL 4518553 (Oct. 10, 2017). 
 16. 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2083 (2017). 
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collateral estoppel,17 forum shopping,18 venue,19 and the doctrine of 
allowing multiple lower courts to develop the law more robustly 
within their respective circuits.20 
This Comment explores the normative value of nationwide 
preliminary injunctions granted by a federal district judge against the 
federal government.21 Given the combination of the preliminary 
nature and the broad scope of a nationwide remedy, there should be a 
presumption against nationwide preliminary injunctions. When a 
judge truly believes a nationwide scope is necessary, she should 
implement procedural safeguards to protect against the concerns that 
result from a determination prior to a hearing on the merits that 
affects parties not before the court. 
The analysis proceeds in three parts. Part I explains the purpose 
and history of preliminary injunctions and the development of the 
now-popular nationwide scope. Part II addresses the concerns of 
granting nationwide preliminary injunctions. Section II.A 
distinguishes between preliminary and permanent injunctions and 
explains both why the distinction is crucial and why it is inappropriate 
to rely on justifications for nationwide permanent injunctions when 
implementing nationwide preliminary injunctions. Section II.B 
discusses the concerns that arise with nationwide preliminary 
injunctions that affect uninvolved nonparties and draws a parallel to 
the concerns behind third-party standing. Part III discusses 
recommendations that could address the concerns with nationwide 
preliminary injunctions and provides input on which 
recommendations would alleviate the concerns highlighted in this 
Comment. 
 
 17. Walker, supra note 14, at 1134. 
 18. Bray, supra note 14 (manuscript at 10–11). 
 19. Kate Huddleston, Nationwide Injunctions: Venue Considerations, 127 YALE L.J.F. 
242, 244 (2017). 
 20. Michelle R. Slack, Separation of Powers and Second Opinions: Protecting the 
Government’s Role in Developing the Law by Limiting Nationwide Class Actions Against 
the Federal Government, 31 REV. LITIG. 943, 944–45 (2012). 
 21. This Comment focuses solely on cases in which the federal government is the 
defendant. Even before President Trump’s administration, there was a political aspect to 
the practice of granting nationwide preliminary injunctions when the defendant is the 
federal government. It is not a coincidence that the lawsuits challenging actions made by 
President Obama’s administration took place in Texas, and a similar pattern of injunctions 
occurred in California during President Bush’s administration. Bray, supra note 14 
(manuscript at at 9–10). The political implications of this practice are beyond the scope of 
this Comment. For more discussion on the topic, see id. (manuscript at 9–12). 
96 N.C. L. REV. 200 (2017) 
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I. PURPOSE AND HISTORY OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS AND 
NATIONWIDE SCOPE 
To understand why there should be a presumption against 
nationwide preliminary injunctions, it is useful to first review the 
origins of preliminary injunctions and how they have evolved to exist 
with a nationwide scope. 
A. Preliminary Injunctions 
A preliminary injunction is “[a] temporary injunction issued 
before or during trial to prevent an irreparable injury from occurring 
before the court has a chance to decide the case.”22 It is used to 
prevent the plaintiffs from suffering harm while the litigation takes 
place.23 Preliminary injunctions “merely .	.	. preserve the relative 
positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held.”24 The 
extraordinary nature of a preliminary injunction stems from the 
courts’ general reluctance to change the parties’ positions prior to the 
plaintiff fully establishing his case.25 Because preliminary injunctions 
are “a drastic and extraordinary remedy,” they should not be granted 
routinely.26 However, federal district court judges have substantial 
discretion in determining whether or not to grant a preliminary 
injunction.27 Once the district court decides to grant a preliminary 
injunction, appellate courts review the decision only for abuse of 
discretion.28 
Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure gives federal 
courts the power to grant preliminary injunctions.29 However, “[t]he 
circumstances in which a preliminary injunction may be granted are 
not prescribed by the Federal Rules.”30 Because Rule 65 does not 
 
 22. Preliminary Injunction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 23. See 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE §	2947 (3d ed. 2016).  
 24. Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981). 
 25. Rachel A. Weisshaar, Note, Hazy Shades of Winter: Resolving the Circuit Split 
over Preliminary Injunctions, 65	VAND. L. REV. 1011, 1022 (2012). 
 26. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 165 (2010). 
 27. Richmond Tenants Org., Inc. v. Kemp, 956 F.2d 1300, 1308 (4th Cir. 1992). 
 28. McCreary Cty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 867 (2005). But see Henry J. 
Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 773–78 (1982) (“There need 
be no concern that such a retraction of the [abuse of] discretion rule would lead to an 
ossification of equity; the necessary leeway is built into the governing equitable principles 
themselves.”).  
 29. FED. R. CIV. P. 65. 
 30. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 23, §	2947, at 114.  
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provide guidance on this issue, “[d]istrict judges still are guided by 
traditional equity doctrines.”31 
Federal courts derive their equity jurisdiction from the 
Constitution and the Federal Judiciary Act.32 The Constitution vests 
“[t]he judicial Power of the United States .	.	. in one supreme Court, 
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time 
ordain and establish,”33 and “[t]he judicial power shall extend to all 
Cases, in Law and Equity.”34 Congress established the rest of the 
federal judiciary system through the Judiciary Act of 1789.35 The 
Judiciary Act gives federal courts the jurisdiction over “all suits of a 
civil nature .	.	. in equity.”36 The Supreme Court has 
long held that “[t]he ‘jurisdiction’ thus conferred [in the 
Judiciary Act]  .	.	. is an authority to administer in equity suits 
the principles of the system of judicial remedies which had been 
devised and was being administered by the English Court of 
Chancery at the time of the separation of the two countries.”37 
Therefore, principles from the English Court of Chancery guide the 
determination of the propriety of federal courts’ equity power. 
Equity developed in England as an alternative system to 
common law when common law courts could not provide plaintiffs 
with adequate relief.38 When a plaintiff wanted to be heard before a 
court, he had to purchase a writ from the Chancellor, who acted on 
behalf of the king.39 This writ was the plaintiff’s golden ticket to gain 
access to the court, and once it was presented to the court, the court 
would hear the case and decide whether to grant relief.40 At this time, 
the types of cases heard by the court primarily involved property 
rights and interests.41 As England’s economy evolved from 
agricultural to commercial, new types of disputes and rights arose for 
which no writs existed.42 This was problematic because the Provisions 
 
 31. Id. §	2942, at 38. 
 32. See U.S. CONST. art. III, §	1; Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §	11, 1 Stat. 73, 78. 
 33. U.S. CONST. art. III, §	1. 
 34. Id. §	2.  
 35. See Judiciary Act of 1789, § 11, 1 Stat. at 78. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo S.A. v. All. Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 318 
(1999) (quoting Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W.I.S., Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 568 (1939)). 
 38. Morton Denlow, The Motion for a Preliminary Injunction: Time for a Uniform 
Federal Standard, 22 REV. LITIG. 495, 500 (2003). 
 39. WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK, HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQUITY 3 (2d ed. 1956). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 4. 
 42. Id. 
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of Oxford of 1258 did not allow the Chancellor to create new writs 
unless he had the consent of the king and his council.43 Therefore, 
when a person sought to resolve a dispute for which no writ, and thus 
no relief, existed, “it became common to resort to the king, through 
the person of the Chancellor, for relief under the king’s prerogative of 
grace, that arbitrary power of the king to do good and dispense 
justice.”44 This practice resulted in the evolution of the Chancellor’s 
role as a judicial officer and the creation of the Court of Chancery, as 
well as and a system of equity that was distinct from the common 
law.45 Although this evolution occurred gradually and slowly, “by the 
15th century the chancellor was clearly a judge, recognized as such 
and acting as such.”46 
Subsequently, the English legal system operated as a dual system 
of common law and equity.47 One of the main differences between a 
common law court and the Court of Chancery was the manner in 
which the Chancellor enforced judgments.48 Unlike a court of law, the 
Chancellor could use the power of contempt to force the defendant to 
act or refrain from acting in a certain way.49 Therefore, the Court of 
Chancery could “prevent[] a threatened wrong or injury or proceed[] 
to repair an injury” through a writ of injunction.50 
When the English colonized America, they brought both systems 
of common law and equity with them.51 Because of the inefficiencies 
and cost of maintaining two court systems, most states merged “legal 
and equitable powers in one court with provision for one form of civil 
action.”52 Early courts were very hesitant to grant preliminary 
 
 43. Id.; see also DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 29 (1973). 
 44. DE FUNIAK, supra note 39, at 4. 
 45. Id. at 4–5; DOBBS, supra note 43, at 31. 
 46. DOBBS, supra note 43, at 31. 
 47. Id. at 33. 
 48. See id. at 32. 
 49. Id.; see also DE FUNIAK, supra note 39, at 11. Given its in personam effect, an 
injunction may be enforced outside of a court’s territorial jurisdiction. HENRY L. 
MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF EQUITY 50 (1936). While this concept seems to support 
broader injunctions (i.e., applying outside of the federal district in which it is granted), it 
actually highlights a narrowing principle of preliminary injunctions—it applies to the 
parties, not to others uninvolved in the lawsuit. Id. When viewed from the perspective of 
the defendant, the federal government, the concept again seems to support nationwide 
injunctions because the federal government acts throughout the entire nation. However, it 
should be interpreted as applying to the defendant’s behavior with regard to the 
plaintiff(s) specifically because the in personam effect of a preliminary injunction 
highlights the importance of binding parties, not territories.  
 50. DE FUNIAK, supra note 39, at 15. 
 51. Id. at 6. 
 52. See id. at 7. 
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injunctions, noting that this type of relief “should be granted with 
great caution, and only when necessity requires.”53 Like judges in 
England, American judges granted injunctions with a focus on 
property rights.54  
The first preliminary injunction case55 heard by the United States 
Supreme Court was Parker v. Winnipiseogee Lake Cotton and 
Woollen Co.56 in 1862. The dispute in Parker arose over the use of the 
Winnipiseogee River in New Hampshire, and the appellant sought a 
preliminary injunction against an alleged nuisance by the appellee.57 
In considering whether to grant the preliminary injunction, the Court 
noted that “[t]he case must be one of strong and imperious 
necessity”58 and “[i]f the evidence be conflicting and injury doubtful, 
this extraordinary remedy will be withheld.”59 The Court ultimately 
denied the appellant’s request for a preliminary injunction because he 
did not show that he was entitled to immediate equitable relief.60 
With the exception of one other case,61 the Supreme Court did not 
hear a case focused on preliminary injunctions again until the 1920s. 
The three cases heard by the Court during this time period all focused 
on the trial court’s discretion to grant preliminary injunctions.62 
The Supreme Court dove further into its analysis of preliminary 
injunctions in the 1940s. In Yakus v. United States,63 the Court 
discussed the appropriateness of preliminary injunctions that enjoined 
the implementation of price regulations during wartime.64 The Court 
noted that when an injunction harms a public interest, “the court may 
.	.	. withhold relief until a final determination of the rights of the 
 
 53. Bronk v. Riley, 3 N.Y.S. 446, 447 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1888); see also Whiting Mfg. 
Co. v. Joseph H. Bauland Co., 56 N.Y.S. 114, 114 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1898); Delaware, L & 
W.R. Co. v. Cent. Stock-Yard & Transit Co., 12 A. 374, 375 (N.J. 1888). 
 54. See Walker, supra note 14, at 1129. 
 55. This determination is based on the Supreme Court cases that are in the Westlaw 
Key section for “Preliminary, Temporary, and Interlocutory Injunctions in General, 
k1071–k1120.”  
 56. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 545 (1862). 
 57. Id. at 546. 
 58. Id. at 552 (quoting Olmstead v. Loomis, 6 Barb. 152, 160 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1849)). 
 59. Id.  
 60. Id. at 553. 
 61. This case, Buffington v. Harvey, briefly discusses the fact that “[t]he granting or 
dissolution of a temporary injunction” is within the discretion of a trial court. 95 U.S. 99, 
100 (1877). 
 62. See Alabama v. United States, 279 U.S. 229, 230–31 (1929); Rice & Adams Corp. 
v. Lathrop, 278 U.S. 509, 514 (1929); Meccano, Ltd. v. Wanamaker, 253 U.S. 136, 141 
(1920). 
 63. 321 U.S. 414 (1944). 
 64. Id. at 441–42. 
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parties, though the postponement may be burdensome to the 
plaintiff.”65 Throughout the rest of the twentieth century, the 
Supreme Court heard several other cases involving preliminary 
injunctions, but scope was never a primary issue.66 
B. Nationwide scope 
Rule 65 also addresses the scope of preliminary injunctions, 
albeit briefly. It describes the scope as binding “the parties; the 
parties’ officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys; and other 
persons who are in active concert or participation with anyone 
described in [the aforementioned groups].”67 However, this is the 
extent of guidance on the permissible scope of preliminary 
injunctions,68 and the Federal Rules do not explicitly discuss the 
authority of federal district courts to grant preliminary injunctions 
that apply to the entire nation.69 Given this lack of guidance and the 
drastic nature of preliminary injunctions, courts typically apply a 
limiting principle to the scope of preliminary injunctions and advise 
narrowly tailored injunctions with limited applicability.70 Allowing a 
broad right to a preliminary injunction creates various concerns for a 
court, such as “an institutional reluctance to undertake the 
supervision of specific relief, a social bias against interference with 
private ordering, and a fear of encouraging unscrupulous litigants to 
institute unfounded actions.”71 As with the decision to grant a 
preliminary injunction, district court judges use traditional equity 
doctrines to guide their determination of the proper scope of 
preliminary injunctions.72 
Nationwide injunctions did not exist within the realm of 
traditional equity because “there were no injunctions against the 
 
 65. Id. at 440. 
 66. See generally Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390 (1981) (questioning 
whether a preliminary injunction should have been granted); Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. 
Bhd. of Teamsters Local No. 70, 415 U.S. 423 (1974) (discussing a conflict between state 
law and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs v. Mo.-Kan.-
Tex. R.R. Co., 363 U.S. 528 (1960) (raising jurisdictional issue); De Beers Consol. Mines v. 
United States, 325 U.S. 212 (1945) (raising jurisdictional issues). 
 67. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(2). 
 68. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 23, §	2955 (noting Rule 65(d) does not clearly 
address the issue of overly broad injunctions).  
 69. CONG. RESEARCH SERV. LEGAL SIDEBAR, NATIONWIDE INJUNCTIONS: RECENT 
RULINGS RAISE QUESTIONS ABOUT NATIONWIDE REACH OF A SINGLE FEDERAL 
COURT (2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/nationwide.pdf [https://perma.cc/9A97-T96D]. 
 70. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 193 (2000); 
Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int’l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707, 715 (5th Cir. 1984). 
 71. Developments in the Law: Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1056 (1965).  
 72. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 23, §	2942.  
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Crown.”73 This is largely due to the structure of the Court of 
Chancery (in that only one Chancellor existed) and the underlying 
fact that the Chancellor was closely associated with the king.74 
Nationwide preliminary injunctions are relatively new to the 
American legal system. According to Samuel Bray, Wirtz v. Baldor 
Electric Company,75 decided in 1963, appears to be the first instance 
of a court granting a nationwide preliminary injunction.76 The issue in 
Wirtz was whether the Secretary of Labor relied on improper 
information when setting the minimum wages.77 The plaintiffs sought 
to enjoin the Secretary’s determination through a preliminary 
injunction, and the D.C. Circuit held that “if one or more of the 
plaintiffs-appellees is or are found to have standing to sue, the 
District Court should enjoin the effectiveness of the Secretary’s 
determination with respect to the entire industry[,]” not just with 
respect to the named plaintiffs.78 
The issue of a nationwide preliminary injunction was raised again 
a decade later in Harlem Valley Transportation Ass’n v. Stafford.79 In 
Harlem Valley, the plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction against 
the Interstate Commerce Commission, its chairman, and the 
Administrator of the EPA for alleged violations related to abandoned 
rail lines under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.80 In 
determining the scope of the injunction, District Court Judge Frankel 
stated, in a footnote, that 
[o]ne of the court’s main concerns during the hearing of the 
motion for a preliminary injunction was the question whether 
the plaintiffs, if they could prove entitlement to any relief, could 
legitimately seek a restraint of nationwide effect when their 
alleged interests might be of narrower geographic scope. Both 
the United States and the ICC have now not only conceded, but 
 
 73. Bray, supra note 14 (manuscript at 20); see also Samuel Bray, The Case Against 
National Injunctions, No Matter Who is President, LAWFARE (Feb. 4, 2017, 4:00 PM), 
https://lawfareblog.com/case-against-national-injunctions-no-matter-who-president 
[http://perma.cc/U584-D5XW] (“[T]he national injunction has no basis in the tradition of 
equity. For the first century and a half of the federal courts, there were no national 
injunctions.”).  
 74. See Bray, supra note 14 (manuscript at 20–21, 39). For a fascinating discussion on 
the impact of the shift from one chancellor in traditional English equity to multiple-
chancellor system in the United States, see id. (manuscript at 40–43). 
 75. 337 F.2d 518 (D.C. Cir. 1963). 
 76. Bray, supra note 14 (manuscript at 33). 
 77. Wirtz, 337 F.2d at 520. 
 78. Id. at 535. 
 79. 360 F. Supp. 1057, 1059 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff’d, 500 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1974). 
 80. Id. at 1059–60. 
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insisted, that a preliminary injunction in this case would “affect 
the agency in the entire scope of its authority and 
jurisdiction.”81 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the 
nationwide scope of the injunction,82 and in doing so, therefore “[t]he 
court had backed into a national injunction without any real 
consideration.”83 Since that time, courts have been willing to grant 
nationwide preliminary injunctions enjoining the federal government 
in a multitude of cases.84 For example, in In re EPA,85 the petitioners 
challenged the “Clean Water Rule,” claiming that the United States 
Army Corps of Engineers and the EPA changed the definition of 
“waters of the United States” in a manner that would unlawfully 
expand the agencies’ jurisdiction and upset the current federal-state 
balance.86 The district court enjoined the Clean Water Rule 
nationwide because the burden of following the new rule would be 
felt nationwide.87 And over the past two years, federal district court 
judges have been granting nationwide preliminary injunctions at an 
alarmingly frequent rate.88 
II. CONCERNS ASSOCIATED WITH NATIONWIDE PRELIMINARY 
INJUNCTIONS 
The concern with an order as drastic as a nationwide preliminary 
injunction is twofold: first, the decision is made prior to a trial on the 
merits, and second, the broad scope affects the interests of parties not 
before the court. When a decision occurs after the full presentation of 
information at a trial on the merits, a nationwide scope may perhaps 
be appropriate. But when the standard to receive injunctive relief is 
low, as it is with preliminary injunctions, a court should be more 
cautious with the scope of its relief.89 Narrowing the scope alleviates 
 
 81. Id. at 1060 n.2. 
 82. Harlem Valley Transp. Ass’n v. Stafford, 500 F.2d 328, 337 (2d Cir. 1974). 
 83. Bray, supra note 14 (manuscript at 35). 
 84. See, e.g., In re EPA, 803 F.3d 804, 808–09 (6th Cir. 2015) (issuing a nationwide 
stay, a remedy similar to an injunction); Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 677 
(S.D. Tex. 2015); Earth Island Inst. v. Pengilly, 376	F.	Supp. 2d 994, 999 (E.D. Cal. 2005), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 490 F.3d 687 (9th Cir. 2007), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 555 U.S. 
488 (2009). 
 85. 803 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 2015). 
 86. Id. at 805–06. 
 87. Id. at 808–09. 
 88. See supra notes 3–8. 
 89. Walker, supra note 14, at 1147–48 (“Because it is easier, as an evidentiary matter, 
to obtain a preliminary injunction, courts should conduct a more searching inquiry into the 
appropriate scope of such an order.”). 
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the issue of nonparties being affected by the preliminary injunction, a 
concern that runs parallel to those raised by third-party standing, and 
it prevents district court judges from interfering with the development 
of law in other circuits.90 
A. Distinction between Preliminary and Permanent Injunctions 
The issue that arises with nationwide preliminary injunctions is 
grounded in the fact that the injunctions are preliminary. While it 
may be true that nationwide injunctions are necessary in certain 
situations, those situations should be limited to instances of 
permanent injunctions.91 To understand why the type of injunction 
impacts the scope, it is important to understand the difference 
between a preliminary and permanent injunction. Despite what some 
discussion in case law might suggest,92 there is a meaningful difference 
between a preliminary and permanent injunction. 
Preliminary and permanent injunctions “are distinct forms of 
equitable relief that have different prerequisites and serve entirely 
different purposes.”93 A preliminary injunction occurs prior to or 
during trial, while a permanent injunction is granted after a hearing 
on the merits.94 Due to the difference in procedural posture of the two 
remedies, the standards for granting a preliminary injunction and for 
granting a permanent injunction are slightly different.95 The key 
difference between these two standards is that a preliminary 
injunction only requires that the plaintiff is likely to win the case on 
 
 90. See infra Section II.B. 
 91. See infra notes 93–95 and accompanying text. 
 92. See infra text accompanying notes 157–68. 
 93. Lermer Germany GmbH v. Lermer Corp., 94 F.3d 1575, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 94. See Permanent Injunction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); 
Preliminary Injunction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also JOSEPH 
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 367 (A.E. Randall ed., 3d ed. 
1920) (“The perpetual injunction is in effect a decree, and concludes a right. The 
interlocutory injunction is merely provisional in its nature, and does not conclude a 
right.”). 
 95. A preliminary injunction requires that the plaintiff “establish that he is likely to 
succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 
preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in 
the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). There is, 
however, currently a circuit split over how to apply these factors. See Weisshaar, supra 
note 25, at 1014–15. The standard of permanent injunctions is similar in that the plaintiff 
must show “(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at 
law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury;	(3) that, 
considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in 
equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent 
injunction.” Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 156–57 (2010). 
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the merits, while a permanent injunction is to be granted after a party 
has already won on the merits.96 This difference creates a lower 
evidentiary standard for preliminary injunctions as compared to the 
standard for permanent injunctions.97 The distinction is one that some 
courts have noticed,98 and it is one that scholars have asserted is a 
meaningful difference.99 
Instances in which nationwide injunctions have been granted, 
and in which courts have made arguments for a nationwide scope, are 
typically permanent, not preliminary, injunctions.100 Considering the 
robust decision-making process that occurs prior to the issuance of a 
permanent injunction, a nationwide scope may be warranted. Because 
a permanent injunction occurs after a full hearing on the merits, a 
judge has found the challenged action to be unlawful, and therefore 
the drastic remedy of an injunction may be appropriate because the 
action, now confirmed to be illegal, needs to be stopped.101 Since the 
trial on the merits occurs prior to the decision about the appropriate 
remedy, a judge makes her decision about the remedy with complete 
information. 
However, in the case of a preliminary injunction, a judge has not 
actually found the challenged action to be unlawful nor has she seen 
 
 96. Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 394 (1981) (noting the impropriety of 
equating “likelihood of success” with “success”); see Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 
480 U.S. 531, 546 n.12 (1987) (“The standard for a preliminary injunction is essentially the 
same as for a permanent injunction with the exception that the plaintiff must show a 
likelihood of success on the merits rather than actual success.”). 
 97. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 755–56 
(1986), overruled on other grounds, Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833 (1992); see also Walker, supra note 14, at 1147–48. 
 98. See, e.g., Bresgal v. Brock, 843 F.2d 1163, 1169 (9th Cir. 1987) (distinguishing the 
injunctions in Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants’ Rights v. INS, 743 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1984) and 
Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719 (9th Cir. 1985) from the case at hand by noting that they were 
preliminary).  
 99. Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 
687, 692 (1990) (“Preliminary relief is best considered as a separate issue, only distantly 
related to the choice of remedy at final judgment.”); Walker, supra note 14, at 1147–48 
(advocating for consideration of the type of injunction when determining the scope of the 
injunction). 
 100. See generally Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 145 F.3d 1399 
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (providing an example of an instance in which the Court issued a 
permanent injunction with nationwide scope). 
 101. Doe v. Rumsfeld, 341 F. Supp. 2d 1, 17 (D.D.C. 2004) (“Government-wide 
injunctive relief for plaintiffs and all individuals similarly situated can be entirely 
appropriate and it is ‘well-supported by precedent, as courts frequently enjoin 
enforcement of regulations ultimately held to be invalid.’”) (quoting Sanjour v. EPA, 7 F. 
Supp. 2d 14, 17 (D.D.C. 1998)); see also Planned Parenthood Fed’n of America, Inc. v. 
Heckler, 712 F.2d 650, 665 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (enjoining enforcement of Title X regulations 
that the court found to be unlawful). 
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the parties’ full evidence and arguments.102 She makes her decision on 
less formal procedures and incomplete information prior to the 
parties’ full opportunity to be heard.103 The information presented at 
the preliminary injunction stage may include “sketchy motion papers 
and affidavits” that rely on incomplete or unreliable information, and 
the defendant may not have sufficient time to prepare and present a 
defense.104 The combination of an incomplete presentation of the 
parties’ cases and the speed at which the judge must decide the issue 
makes it more likely for the court to make an error.105 For this reason, 
any findings at the preliminary injunction stage are not binding at the 
trial on the merits.106 This acknowledges that findings made during the 
preliminary injunction phase of litigation are not fully informed 
findings. The practice of making these findings on incomplete 
information is accepted for preliminary injunctions due to their time-
sensitive nature.107 
The distinction between preliminary and permanent injunctions 
is highlighted in Harmon v. Thornburgh.108 In Harmon, the D.C. 
Circuit modified a permanent injunction issued by the district court 
that prevented the Department of Justice from conducting random 
drug tests on its employees.109 When discussing the appropriate 
 
 102. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 111 
(1991); John Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 525, 
525 (1978). 
 103. Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981). Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 65 does require a hearing prior to granting a preliminary injunction. See FED. 
R. CIV.	P.	65(a)(2); see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 23, §	2941 (noting that temporary-
restraining order may proceed without hearing but preliminary injunction requires one). 
However, the standard for a preliminary injunction requires a likelihood of success, not a 
showing of success. See supra text accompanying notes 94–95. This lower standard 
normally results in a less robust presentation of the parties’ cases. See Consolidation Coal 
Co. v. Disabled Miners, 442 F.2d 1261, 1267 (4th Cir. 1971) (“Whenever the extraordinary 
writ of injunction is granted, it should be tailored to restrain no more than what is 
reasonably required to accomplish its ends. Particularly is this so when preliminary relief, 
on something less than a full record and full resolution of the facts, is granted.”).  
 104. LAYCOCK, supra note 102, at 111. 
 105. Id.; see also ACLU of Ill. v. City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265, 269 (7th Cir. 1986) 
(noting how preliminary injunctions put judges in “the awkward position of having to 
make a judgment, with potentially serious consequences	for the litigants and perhaps 
others as well, on an incomplete, because hastily compiled, record”); RICHARD A. 
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 760 (8th ed. 2011) (“Because the judge is being 
asked to rule in a hurry, on the basis of incomplete information, the risk of error is 
great.”).  
 106. Camenisch, 451 U.S. at 395; see also Mayo v. Lakeland Highlands Canning Co., 
309 U.S. 310, 316 (1940). 
 107. Camenisch, 451 U.S. at 395. 
 108. 878 F.2d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
 109. Id. at 485, 493. 
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remedy, the court noted that “[w]hen a reviewing court determines 
that agency regulations are unlawful, the ordinary result is that the 
rules are vacated—not that their application to the individual 
petitioners is proscribed.”110 Therefore the rule is vacated with regard 
to everyone, not just the named plaintiffs. However, this only occurs 
once a court determines the agency regulation to be unlawful after a 
full trial on the merits, as the district court held in Harmon.111 The 
district court’s decision was made based on complete information 
after the parties had a full opportunity to present their evidence and 
be heard.112 Yet courts frequently cite this case as support of 
nationwide preliminary injunctions113 in instances which the parties 
have not had a full trial on the merits. The rule articulated in Harmon 
should not be applied to a preliminary injunction because the 
reviewing court has not yet found the agency regulation to be 
unlawful. It has simply found that the party is likely to succeed on the 
merits, a lower standard and one based on less information than the 
permanent injunction standard. 
Despite the distinction between preliminary and permanent 
injunctions, courts frequently and interchangeably cite to cases 
involving preliminary injunctions and cases involving permanent 
injunctions, like Harmon, to support a nationwide preliminary 
injunction.114 In some instances, a court will solely cite cases involving 
permanent injunctions to justify a nationwide preliminary injunction. 
For example, in the appeal of Texas I, the Fifth Circuit opinion cites 
several cases as support for its affirmance of the district court’s 
nationwide preliminary injunction, but all of the cited cases involve 
permanent injunctions.115 It may be true that “[i]t is not beyond the 
 
 110. Id. at 495 n.21 (emphasis added). 
 111. Id. at 493. 
 112. See id. at 487.  
 113. Franciscan All., Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp. 3d. 660, 695 (N.D. Tex. 2016); Nat’l 
Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Perez, No. 5:16-cv-00066, 2016 WL 3766121, at *46 (N.D. Tex. June 
27, 2016). 
 114. See, e.g., Easyriders Freedom F.I.G.H.T. v. Hannigan, 92 F.3d 1486, 1501–02 (9th 
Cir. 1996) (citing Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983) (involving a preliminary 
injunction); Bresgal v. Brock, 843 F.2d 1163, 1170–71 (9th Cir. 1987) (involving the use of 
a permanent injunction to justify the scope of the permanent injunction in the instant 
case)); see also Perez, 2016 WL 3766121, at *46. Perez cites: Califano v. Yamaski, 442 U.S. 
682, 702 (1979) (analyzing propriety of nationwide class); Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 
134, 188 (5th Cir. 2015) (involving a preliminary injunction); Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. U.S. 
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 145 F.3d 1399, 1407–09 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (involving a permanent 
injunction); and Harmon, 878 F.2d at 495 n.21 (involving a permanent injunction).  
 115. 809 F.3d 134, 188 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing Earth Island Inst. v. Ruthenbeck,	490 F.3d 
687, 699 (9th Cir. 2006)	(issuing permanent injunction);	Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary 
Purchasing Grps. Inc.,	659 F.2d 695, 705–06 (5th Cir. 1981) (issuing permanent 
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power of a court, in appropriate circumstances, to issue a nationwide 
injunction.”116 However, courts should take greater care to 
understand the distinctions between preliminary and permanent 
injunctions when considering a nationwide scope. 
B. Nonparty Concerns 
When preliminary injunctions are nationwide in scope, not only 
is the decision to grant the injunction based on incomplete 
information, but the decision can also affect those across the nation 
who are uninvolved in the litigation. While the uninvolved parties are 
not technically bound by the preliminary injunction,117 they are 
nevertheless affected by it. Specifically, they are likely people who 
benefited from a federal rule or regulation that was subsequently 
enjoined by a preliminary injunction, like employees who would have 
been entitled to overtime wages had the Department of Labor’s new 
overtime rule not been enjoined.118 These parties effectively have 
their rights adjudicated without any opportunity to participate in the 
adjudication,119 despite the fact that a court “may not attempt to 
determine the rights of persons not before the court.”120 
The concerns of nonparties being affected by nationwide 
preliminary injunctions without participating in the litigation parallel 
the concerns that arise with third party standing, which governs 
whether a party indirectly affected by litigation has standing due to its 
closely aligned interests with one of the parties. The prohibition on 
third party standing is a prudential limitation, which means a principle 
that “embodies ‘judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of 
federal jurisdiction.’”121 Prudential limitations ensure that courts are 
not “called upon to decide abstract questions of wide public 
 
injunction);	Brennan v. J.M. Fields, Inc.,	488 F.2d 443, 449–50 (5th Cir.1973) (issuing 
permanent injunction);	Hodgson v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n,	455 F.2d 818, 826 (5th 
Cir. 1972) (issuing permanent injunction)). 
 116. 809 F.3d at 188 (emphasis added). 
 117. The federal government is the only party that is specifically enjoined. 
 118. See Nevada v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 218 F. Supp. 3d 520, 525 (E.D. Tex. 2016). 
While parties may also be harmed by the enjoined rule or regulation, and therefore 
benefit from the injunction, this Comment is primarily concerned with the parties who are 
negatively affected by the practice of nationwide injunctions. 
 119. See Morley, supra note 14, at 529. 
 120. Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983); see also Singleton v. Wuff, 428 
U.S. 106, 113 (1976) (“Federal courts must hesitate before resolving a controversy, even 
one within their constitutional power to resolve, on the basis of the rights of third persons 
not parties to the litigation.”). 
 121. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11–12 (2004) (quoting Allen 
v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)). 
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significance even though other governmental institutions may be 
more competent to address the questions and even though judicial 
intervention may be unnecessary to protect individual rights.”122 
Specifically with regard to third party standing, courts are generally 
hesitant to “resolv[e] a controversy, even one within their 
constitutional power to resolve, on the basis of the rights of third 
persons not parties to the litigation.”123 The Supreme Court has given 
two reasons for this hesitance: “courts should not adjudicate [third 
party] rights unnecessarily,” and “third parties themselves usually will 
be the best proponents of their own rights.”124 However, third party 
standing may be permissible when the “underlying justifications” for 
the prudential limitation do not exist.125 
There are many similarities between third party standing and 
nationwide preliminary injunctions. Both are discretionary.126 Both 
doctrines involve considering the interests of parties not before the 
court,127 and they both require courts to exercise restraint,128 
especially when presented with a constitutional issue.129 These 
similarities are meaningful considering the ill-fated future of third 
party standing and other prudential limitations on standing.130 Given 
the fact that the concerns articulated about prudential standing and 
potential impropriety of third party standing can be translated to 
nationwide preliminary injunctions, a move away from third party 
 
 122. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975). 
 123. Singleton v. Wulff, 426 U.S. 106, 113 (1976). 
 124. Id. at 113–14. 
 125. See id. at 114. 
 126. Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 145 F.3d 1399, 1408 (D.C. Cir. 
1998) (“[D]istrict courts enjoy broad discretion in awarding injunctive relief.”); Richard H. 
Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV. L. 
REV. 1321, 1359–60 (2000). 
 127. See Nat’l Mining Ass’n, 145 F.3d at 1409; Fallon, supra note 126, at 1359–60. 
 128. See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 27 (2008); Barrows v. 
Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953). 
 129. U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 732 n.2 (1990); Converse Const. Co. 
v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 899 F. Supp. 753, 767 (D. Mass. 1995). 
 130. In Lexmark International Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 
(2014), the Supreme Court recently suggested that the end of prudential standing is near. 
See id. at 1387 n.3; 33 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, CHARLES H. KOCH, JR. & RICHARD 
MURPHY, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §	8413 (3d. ed. Supp. 2017) (discussing 
Lexmark)). Lexmark purports to not address third party standing, 134 S. Ct. at 1387 n.3, 
but scholars have hypothesized that this case represents a shift away from the use of 
prudential standing. See Erin F. Delaney, Analyzing Avoidance: Judicial Strategy in 
Comparative Perspective, 66 DUKE L.J. 1, 28 n.131 (2016) (noting that Lexmark “cast[s] 
doubt on the framing of .	.	. prohibitions on third-party standing”); Ernest A. Young, 
Prudential Standing After Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 
10 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 149, 152–53 (2014). 
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standing suggests a similar need to move away from nationwide 
preliminary injunctions. 
When considering the similarities between third party standing 
and nationwide preliminary injunctions, it is worth noting that the two 
doctrines do not perfectly align. In third party standing cases, the 
plaintiff brings a suit in order to represent the rights of someone not 
party to the suit,131 and “the enjoyment of the right [asserted by the 
litigant on behalf of the third party]” has to be “inextricably bound up 
with the activity the litigant wishes to pursue.”132 For example, in 
Singleton v. Wulff,133 physicians brought suit challenging a Missouri 
state law that excluded abortions from Medicaid eligibility.134 The 
Supreme Court allowed the physicians to bring suit on behalf of their 
patients seeking abortions because even though the physicians were 
not the parties seeking to have abortions covered by Medicaid, the 
physicians are necessary for the patients to obtain the abortions; 
therefore, their interests were sufficiently close.135 In addition, these 
types of suits generally challenge government action on behalf of 
parties who are harmed by the action.136 With nationwide preliminary 
injunctions, the concern is for nonparties to the suit whose interests 
do not align with the plaintiffs’ because they actually benefit from the 
government action. Nationwide preliminary injunctions do not 
implicate third party standing in a direct sense, as the plaintiffs are 
not bringing suit on behalf of the people who benefit from the 
challenged regulation. 
Furthermore, a party affected by a nationwide preliminary 
injunction may not have an issue with or actually benefit from the 
enjoined practice. Nonparties to a lawsuit often purposely do not 
assert their rights because they can exercise their rights regardless of 
the outcome of litigation, or they simply do not want to assert them.137 
For example, Jose Lopez and Martín Jonathan Batalla Vidal both 
benefited from the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals 
(“DACA”) program as it allowed them to obtain employment 
 
 131. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410–11 (1991). 
 132. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 114 (1976). 
 133. 428 U.S. 106 (1976). 
 134. Id. at 108. 
 135. Id. at 117. 
 136. See, e.g., id. at 108 (finding that physicians have standing to assert the rights of 
their patients while challenging a state statute). 
 137. See id. at 113–14. 
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authorization.138 However, their right to obtain their employment 
authorization was adjudicated before a Texas court without an 
opportunity to be heard.139 The nationwide preliminary injunction 
enjoining the implementation of the DACA program turned Lopez, 
Vidal, and many others who were not parties before the court into 
“members of an implied class, despite the fact that they have not been 
brought before the court, been notified about the case, or consented 
to such representation.”140 With nationwide preliminary injunctions, 
nonparties who may have an important stake in the litigation simply 
do not matter and are not taken into consideration.141 
Beyond the comparison to third party standing, an important 
distinction to make when discussing the rights of nonparties is that the 
parties are being affected by the injunction, but they are not 
technically bound by the injunction because they are not parties to 
the litigation.142 Instead, they are affected by the ruling through the 
party who is enjoined from acting.143 Rule	65(d)(2) states that the 
preliminary injunction binds the parties and any party that acts in 
concert with the bound parties.144 It is inaccurate to use Rule 65 as 
support for the consideration of nonparties because the rule only 
discusses who is bound, or forced to refrain from acting by the 
injunction.145 The Ninth Circuit adopted this misguided viewpoint in 
Zepeda v. INS,146 quoting Rule 65 and then noting “[t]he district court 
must, therefore, tailor the injunction to affect only those persons over 
which it has power.”147 In his dissent, Judge Norris took issue with this 
interpretation. He noted that Rule 65 “only provides that an 
injunction may not bind non-parties,” and it “does not address the 
question whether an injunction may benefit non-parties.”148 This 
distinction is a logical one, and it is important to note that using this 
 
 138. See Complaint at 2, Lopez v. Richardson, No. 1:16-cv-09670 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 12, 
2016); Amended Complaint at 2, Make the Road N.Y. v. Baran, No. 1:16-cv-04756 
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2016). 
 139. See Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 677 (S.D. Tex. 2015). 
 140. Morley, supra note 14, at 527–28. 
 141. See Ryan C. Williams, Due Process, Class Action Opt Outs, and the Right Not to 
Sue, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 599, 648 (2015) (“[N]either the ability of the plaintiff to assert 
the claim nor the scope of the prospective injunctive relief will depend on whether any 
other similarly situated plaintiffs consent to the action or join in seeking similar relief.”). 
 142. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(2). 
 143. See, e.g., Texas I, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 677. 
 144. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(2). 
 145. Id. 
 146. 753 F.2d 719 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 147. Id. at 727. 
 148. Id. at 733 (Norris, J., dissenting). 
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Rule	65 line of reasoning is not particularly useful in justifying 
concerns for the rights of nonparties in nationwide preliminary 
injunctions. Judge Norris further noted “[t]he question before us for 
decision is not whether the injunction is overly broad because it may 
benefit persons other than the plaintiffs; the question is whether the 
injunction is broader in scope than reasonably necessary to protect 
the rights of the individual plaintiffs.”149 While his refocusing of the 
issue places emphasis on the predominant question of determining 
the scope of a preliminary injunction, the effect on nonparties should 
not be ignored. Judge Norris’s framing of the effect makes the effect 
appear to be harmless because his discussion only mentions benefits 
that can be obtained from the injunction.150 Focusing on a beneficial 
effect aligns with justifications for third party standing.151 But he did 
not consider effects that place a burden on nonparties, which is 
arguably more important than benefits because it harms the 
nonparties. 
Courts may consider nonparty interests when issuing nationwide 
preliminary injunctions, but the consideration likely takes place only 
during the decision as to whether an injunction should be granted, not 
during the determination of the scope of the injunction. One of the 
factors to be used in considering the appropriateness of a preliminary 
injunction is whether the injunction “is in the public interest.”152 
Because injunctions are an “extraordinary remedy,” precedent has 
cautioned that “courts of equity should pay particular regard for the 
public consequences in employing .	.	. [an] injunction.”153 When 
analyzing this factor, courts weigh the harm of the practice that is the 
focus of the injunction (i.e., the rule or regulation) with the harm that 
could result from the preliminary injunction.154 For example, in 
Nevada v. U.S. Department of Labor,155 the district court weighed the 
harm to the public that could result from enjoining the overtime 
rule.156 The plaintiffs pointed to the potential for harm to the public if 
the rule was not enjoined, including layoffs, increased state budgets, 
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and interference with government operations.157 The defendants 
identified the harm that the rule sought to fix, the denial of overtime 
pay to workers.158 These workers are the affected nonparties with 
whom this Comment is concerned. The district court found that an 
injunction would best serve the public interest, relying on the idea 
that a preliminary injunction is meant to preserve the status quo, and 
“if the [overtime rule] is valid, then an injunction will only delay the 
regulation’s implementation.”159 This reasoning is logical for 
determining whether or not an injunction is warranted. However, 
recognizing that harm may occur to parties affected by the 
preliminary injunction, like the workers who would be denied 
additional pay, should be taken into account when defining the scope 
of the preliminary injunction. A more narrowing principle to limit the 
harm should be encouraged. 
There are instances in which a court can properly exercise its 
power that affects parties who are not before it. In National Mining 
Association v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,160 the D.C. Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s invalidation of a U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers regulation and the district court’s implementation of a 
nationwide permanent injunction preventing enforcement of the 
regulation.161 In discussing the scope of the injunction, the court 
explained that when “[an agency] rule is invalidated, .	.	. a single 
plaintiff, so long as he is injured by the rule, may obtain 
‘programmatic’ relief that affects the rights of parties not before the 
court.”162 This makes sense. If a court finds an agency rule to be 
unlawful, the rule should not be applied to anyone, not just solely the 
party who challenged it in court. But again, this relates back to the 
point that this ruling applies to parties who are not before the court 
after a full hearing on the merits in which the rule was found to be 
unlawful.163 
An additional issue that arises with nonparties being affected by 
nationwide preliminary injunctions occurs when the nonparties are 
involved in litigating the same issue in another district or another 
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circuit, creating confusion as to which court’s ruling the nonparty is 
bound by. The tension between Texas v. United States (Texas	II)164 
and Carcaño v. McCrory165 is illustrative of this issue. Both cases 
involved the Department of Education’s guidance regarding its 
interpretation of the word “sex” to include gender identity in Title 
IX.166 In Texas II, the federal district court judge in the Northern 
District of Texas granted a nationwide preliminary injunction that 
enjoined the federal government from enforcing its interpretation of 
“sex.”167 Days later, a federal district judge in the Middle District of 
North Carolina granted a limited preliminary injunction to the named 
plaintiffs that had the opposite effect.168 The Carcaño preliminary 
injunction allowed agencies to follow the Department of Education 
guidance with respect to the named plaintiffs,169 relying on Fourth 
Circuit precedent. The judge acknowledged the nationwide 
preliminary injunction by the Texas judge, but he essentially ignored 
it for jurisdictional purposes.170 This results begs the question—is the 
Texas judge’s nationwide preliminary injunction truly nationwide if a 
district court judge in another circuit can simply ignore it? 
Courts attempt to address these nonparty concerns and 
frequently cite Califano v. Yamasaki171 as support for creating 
nationwide preliminary injunctions;172 however, reliance on this case 
for nationwide preliminary injunctions without a class action is 
improper. Califano primarily deals with certifying a nationwide 
class,173 so the nonparty concerns are addressed by the class 
certification process.174 A frequently cited phrase from Califano is 
 
 164. 201 F. Supp. 3d 810 (N.D. Tex. 2016). 
 165. 203 F. Supp. 3d 615 (M.D.N.C. 2016). 
 166. Id. at 636; Texas II, 201 F. Supp. 3d at 815–16. 
 167. Texas II, 201 F. Supp. 3d at 836. 
 168. See Carcaño, 203 F. Supp. 3d. at 653. Interestingly, the preliminary injunction in 
Carcaño applied only to the named plaintiffs because “the current complaint asserts no 
claim for class relief.” Id. 
 169. See id. at 636, 653 (citing G.G. v. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 
2016), vacated and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017) (mem.). 
 170. Carcaño, 203 F. Supp. 3d. at 635 n.22 (“Because Texas is a district court opinion 
from outside the Fourth Circuit, however, and because the court’s order was issued after 
the initiation of this case, this court remains bound by G.G. and the Texas order has no 
direct effect on this litigation.”). 
 171. 442 U.S. 682 (1979). 
 172. See, e.g., Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 539 (N.D. Cal. 2017); 
Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539, 565 (D. Md. 2017); 
Nevada v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 218 F. Supp. 3d 520, 533 (E.D. Tex. 2016); Texas II, 201 F. 
Supp. 3d at 836; Franciscan All., Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp. 3d 660, 695 (N.D. Tex. 2016).  
 173. Califano, 442 U.S. at 684. 
 174. Id. at 701. 
96 N.C. L. REV. 200 (2017) 
222 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96 
“the scope of injunctive relief is dictated by the extent of the violation 
established, not by the geographical extent of the plaintiff class.”175 A 
complete reading is required to prevent a skewed perspective of this 
rule: “Nor is a nationwide class inconsistent with principles of equity 
jurisprudence, since the scope of injunctive relief is dictated by the 
extent of the violation established, not by the geographical extent of 
the plaintiff class.”176 The premise of this rule about the scope of 
injunctive relief is supported by the underlying requirement of a 
nationwide class. The paragraph in which this rule is discussed in 
context of a class action and relates to the geographical scope of a 
plaintiff class.177 Moreover, the following sentence supports the 
precondition of a class certification when applying this rule: 
[i]f a class action is otherwise proper, and if jurisdiction lies over 
the claims of the members of the class, the fact that the class is 
nationwide in scope does not necessarily mean that the relief 
afforded the plaintiffs will be more burdensome than necessary 
to redress the complaining parties.178 
Courts have also claimed authority to grant nationwide 
preliminary injunctions179 using language in Califano that says 
“[a]bsent the clearest command to the contrary from Congress, 
federal courts retain their equitable power to issue injunctions in suits 
over which they have jurisdiction.”180 The court does not specify what 
type of jurisdiction it is referring to in the Califano opinion; however, 
the cases it cites to support its proposition involve equity 
jurisdiction.181 Equity jurisdiction 
does not refer to jurisdiction in the sense of the power 
conferred by the sovereign on the court over specified subject-
matters or to jurisdiction over the res or the persons of the 
parties in a particular proceeding but refers rather to the merits. 
The want of equity jurisdiction does not mean that the court 
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has no power to act but that it should not act, as on the ground, 
for example, that there is an adequate remedy at law.182 
Therefore, the Califano opinion simply reiterates that the court 
has the equitable power to issue injunctions. This was a concern in the 
case because the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare made a statutory argument that the Court did not have 
jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief given the limited jurisdiction 
provided by the Social Security Act.183 The Court noted that 
“[n]othing in either the language or the legislative history of [the 
Social Security Act] indicates that Congress intended to preclude 
injunctive relief in §	205(g) suits.”184 Therefore this rule does not 
stand for the proposition that district courts have the power to issue 
nationwide preliminary injunctions. Rather, it simply stands for the 
fact that courts retain their ability to grant injunctive relief unless 
Congress explicitly limits them from doing so. 
III. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The unappealing nature of nationwide preliminary injunctions 
and the lack of guidance in determining the scope of preliminary 
injunctions can leave courts with a conundrum as to what to do when 
a party requests a preliminary injunction against the federal 
government. Some scholars have proposed creating a requirement 
that nationwide preliminary injunctions should only be issued when 
they are necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.185 
Others have suggested practical solutions such as adopting different 
standards of review, treating declaratory judgments as legal, and no 
longer allowing the plaintiff to draft the injunction.186 
While these proposed solutions are meaningful and could prove 
to be effective, they do not directly address the nonparty concerns 
raised in this Comment. They aim to restrict the power of a federal 
district court judge and limit the scope of the injunction, but they still 
allow for the possibility of parties not before the court to be affected 
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by the preliminary injunction. However, several proposed reforms do 
address those concerns. One such reform includes the creation of a 
system of notice for parties who may be affected by a nationwide 
injunction.187 This type of system would allow parties who would be 
affected by a nationwide preliminary injunction to have an 
opportunity to become involved in the action, giving them the chance 
to represent their interests. Yet depending on the case, it may be 
impractical to provide notice to every potential party who may be 
affected by an injunction. For example, it would be difficult to 
provide notice and opportunity to intervene to every person in the 
United States who is no longer entitled to overtime wages as a result 
of the Department of Labor Rule being enjoined in Nevada v. U.S. 
Department of Labor. 
Another potential reform advocates for a rule requiring an 
injunction that enjoins the enforcement of a federal law or regulation 
to be narrowly tailored to only apply to the plaintiffs.188 Again, this 
would prevent nonparties to the lawsuit from being affected by the 
preliminary injunction. A frequent criticism of this solution is that 
parties who were uninvolved in the narrowly tailored preliminary 
injunction would bring duplicative suits in order to also obtain a 
preliminary injunction, opening a “floodgate” of litigation.189 This 
concern is understandable, especially in the D.C. Circuit, where a 
great amount of challenges to federal agency action takes place.190 
However, when considering the purpose of a preliminary injunction, 
the actual likelihood of duplicative litigation seems low. Preliminary 
injunctions are meant to be temporary until a trial on the merits is 
held. If the plaintiff succeeds after a full trial on the merits, then a 
court can grant a permanent injunction that applies nationwide, 
preventing duplicative litigation. Any nonparties would be covered by 
the permanent injunction.191 They may be left without relief in the 
interim while the issue is being litigated, but knowing that the matter 
is in the process of being resolved in the near future is reassurance 
that they do not need to go through the hassle of litigation. Moreover, 
scholars have noted that in practice “[c]ourts do not generally get 
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bogged down dealing with a multiplicity of interests in preliminary 
injunction cases.”192 
An additional solution—requiring plaintiffs to re-file the case as 
a class action if a court determines that a nationwide injunction is 
unavoidable—would ensure all parties with a stake in the litigation 
have the opportunity to represent their interests.193 This solution 
provides the procedural safeguards of the class certification process. 
Class actions are a meaningful way to ensure the procedural 
safeguards, such as notice and opportunity to be heard, are in place 
prior to granting a nationwide preliminary injunction. This approach 
was taken in National Center for Immigrants Rights, Inc. v. INS,194 in 
which the defendants sought to reverse the grant of a preliminary 
injunction to stop the implementation of a new INS regulation.195 The 
district court granted the preliminary injunction without certifying a 
class.196 The Ninth Circuit remanded the case, finding the scope of the 
preliminary injunction to be too broad.197 The court held that “in the 
absence of class certification, the preliminary injunction may properly 
cover only the named plaintiffs.”198 Class action certification allows 
the opportunity for nonparties to have an opportunity to assert their 
rights before the court in the adjudication of the preliminary 
injunction.199 When no class action exists, courts should tend to be 
more cautious in granting nationwide preliminary injunctions.200 In 
addition, limiting the class to the region of appellate jurisdiction 
would create further assurance that a federal district court would not 
intrude on the precedent or judicial independence of other circuits.201 
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This would limit issues such as the one that arose with the 
contradictory results in Texas II and Carcaño v. McCrory.202 
CONCLUSION 
It is difficult to think of a remedy more “extraordinary and 
drastic”203 than a nationwide preliminary injunction granted by a 
federal district court judge, whose jurisdiction is usually limited to one 
state or a district within one state. This type of injunctive relief 
spreads beyond the borders of the judge’s territorial jurisdiction and 
encroaches on people who live thousands of miles from the judge in 
significant and meaningful ways. This practice is concerning given the 
incomplete information used to grant preliminary injunctions and the 
potential for a substantial effect on nonparty interests. Given these 
concerns, this Comment suggests that there should be a presumption 
against nationwide preliminary injunctions. Should there be a 
sufficient showing that a nationwide preliminary injunction is 
unavoidable, this Comment recommends the requirement of 
additional procedural safeguards, such as a notice system or class 
certification, to alleviate the nonparty concerns that arise with this 
practice. 
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